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Abstract. Staying anonymous and not revealing real identity is highly
desired in today’s mobile business. Especially generic frameworks for dif-
ferent kinds of context-aware mobile business applications should provide
communication anonymity of mobile users as a core security feature. For
enabling communication anonymity, Mix-net based solutions are widely
accepted and used. But directly deploying existing Mix-net clients on mo-
bile devices with limited hardware capacity is not a realistic approach. In
addition, different anonymity sensitivities of both applications and users
require to enforce anonymity dynamically rather than on a fixed level. In
this paper, we present an approach towards a solution that addresses the
specific anonymity challenges in mobile business while exploiting the ben-
efits of existing Mix-net frameworks.
1 Motivation
Hiding real identity is inevitable for people who do not like to share their personal
information or secrets with others. They do not want others to get to know their
meeting schedules with their business partners, which books they buy and read,
how much money they have in their bank accounts, which transactions they execute
with their credit cards, etc. We can give many more examples. In short, people
highly prefer staying anonymous as far as and whenever possible. In the internet
age, the number of interactions people have with their environment (i.e. their
business partners, companies, public service organizations, etc.) has enormously
increased. At the same time, the anonymity requirement remains, although it has
become more difficult to meet. Staying anonymous when sending e-mails, visiting
web pages, and doing e-commerce is needed but not easy to achieve.
In this paper, we consider the scenario of a generic framework for context-aware
mobile business (m-business) applications in which mobile client devices like mobile
phones, PDAs, etc., are used for business transactions. Mobile business services
are often organized in service-oriented architectures [7] with three main principals.
Service providers offer paid or free services to their customers. Mobile users carry
PDAs or other capable mobile devices and are interested in receiving the services
offered by the service providers. A broker registers the services of service providers
and returns the service descriptions to mobile users upon request. The broker plays
the role of a trusted third party from the business point of view.
Analyses of the security requirements in mobile business environments indicate
that anonymity and protection of the mobile user’s personal data is one of the
most challenging risks [18, 5]. Although security and anonymity are non-functional
properties of a system, its user acceptance directly depends on these features.
We distinguish two types of anonymity – content anonymity and communi-
cation anonymity – which both have to be fulfilled in order to provide complete
anonymity. Pseudonyms can provide content anonymity by keeping the users’ real
identities secret, but an attacker who is able to sniff incoming and outgoing mes-
sages on the network nodes can at least find out which nodes communicate with
each other. This type of threat to anonymity can be averted by ensuring unlinka-
bility of user actions [14].
In this paper, we study communication anonymity rather than content anonymity.
We will therefore refer to communication anonymity simply by anonymity in the
remainder of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the types of existing so-
lutions for communication anonymity. The new anonymity challenges in mobile
business frameworks and the suitability of existing solutions in this context are
discussed in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents our architecture with a threat model for
providing anonymity, and Sect. 5 discusses the pros and cons of our solution ap-
proach. Possible future work is explained in Sect. 6, and Sect. 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Existing Solutions for Anonymity
In the literature, existing solutions for communication anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity of user actions are categorized into three groups: proxies, peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks and Mix-net [11].
In a proxy-based solution, a trusted proxy (anonymizer) receives user requests,
rewrites some parts of the request in order to hide sender-specific data and sends
it to the final receiver. Replies from the receiver are in turn forwarded to the real
sender. The drawback of this scheme is that users have to trust the proxy and
there are no protection mechanisms in the channel between users and proxies. For
example, www.anonymizer.com is a well-known proxy for anonymous web surfing.
With the increasing popularity of peer-to-peer applications, communication
anonymity solutions based on P2P networks have been designed [16, 8]. Unlike
anonymizer proxies, there is no need for a trusted party within these systems.
Each user shares an encrypted secure channel with other users in the P2P network.
Initially, the user chooses a random path (a user group) and sends the message
along this path to the final receiver. In mobile Internet communication, mCrowds
[1] presents an anonymity solution for P2P networks.
The last type of solution is Mix-net, which is a more promising approach for
the m-business framework compared to proxies and P2P networks. It was first
suggested by Chaum for anonymous e-mail communication [4]. Amix is a computer
which resides between a sender and a receiver. When a mix gets a message, it
decrypts it and forwards the remaining part to the next mix or the final receiver.
A group of mixes composes a network called Mix-net. Chaum’s traditional Mix-net
was based on public key operations, but today, Mix-net based solutions relying on
symmetric encryption also exist.
Mix-net based solutions are well accepted in academia and have also been de-
signed and deployed for different application scenarios. For example, there are
solutions for anonymous communication over ISDN networks (ISDN-Mixes [15])
and for anonymous email communication (smtp-remailers [13]). Jap [10] and Tor
[6] are recent Mix-net implementations focussing on anonymous web surfing. Their
anonymity service is based on the SOCKS protocol [12] and can cover any applica-
tion layer protocol (e.g. ftp, p2p, http, https, etc.). However, Jap does not support
protocols other than HTTP due to some organizational reasons and functions as
a HTTP proxy.
Jap has a cascade-style Mix-net, whereas Tor supports free nodes. A cascade
of Jap consists of two or three mix nodes in a fixed sequential order. The user can
only choose the cascade but no particular mix nodes. Supporting free nodes, Tor
allows to choose arbitrary paths through mix nodes.
In Jap, users start the client application and choose a cascade satisfying their
anonymity requirement. Each cascade offers different levels of anonymity based
on the number of active users on the chosen cascade and traffic parameters. As
of September 2005, there were 5 official Jap cascades installed. The default Jap
cascade Dresden-Dresden, which is managed by the developers of Jap, has around
1400-1500 simultaneously active users on average [17].
In Tor, since the message route among free mix nodes is chosen randomly, a
higher level of anonymity can be achieved compared to the fixed mix order of cas-
cades. On the other hand, dummy messages and time delays for higher anonymity
are only supported in Jap, but not in Tor.
3 New Anonymity Challenges
One could integrate Jap or Tor client applications into an m-business framework
and enable mobile users to communicate anonymously via Jap or Tor networks. But
the m-business scenario yields several specific challenges, with limited capabilities
of mobile PDAs and the requirement of a dynamic anonymity (see Section 3.2)
rather than anonymity at a fixed level being the most important ones.
3.1 Limited Hardware Capabilities
In today’s Mix-networks, the sender is required to encrypt a message with the
symmetric key of each mix in the message route before sending. Therefore, a key
handshake process should be executed between the sender and each mix in the
route. These encryption and key handshake processes are very heavy and time
consuming operations that mobile PDAs cannot put up with. For illustration, Ta-
ble 1 shows the performance of the required cryptographic operations1. The tests
were done on both a Zaurus SL-C3000 PDA (416 MHz CPU/64 MB RAM) and an
IBM Thinkpad R51 notebook (1.7 GHz CPU/1 GB RAM). For the implementa-
tion, we used Bouncy Castle leightweight cryptographic APIs [3]. Note that 100%
of CPU power was used during the test computations. Thus, even if we decrease
the priority of the cryptographic operations, other applications running on the
PDA will hardly be useable while Mix-net clients are executed.
3.2 Dynamic Anonymity
Both Jap and Tor provide a fixed level of anonymity. You start your client applica-
tion with a particular configuration, and you cannot easily change or manage your
anonymity level afterwards. But the m-business framework requires an anonymity
feature that enables dynamic updates of anonymity levels for the following reasons:
1 Not all operations in Table 1 are required for Mix-net clients, but for the sake of com-
pleteness, we have also included the execution times for RSA key generation (normally
performed offline), decryption and digital signing.
Table 1. Performance of Cryptographic Operations
Operation Time Consumption on
Zaurus
SL-C3000 (416
MHz)
IBM Thinkpad
R51 (1.7 GHz)
RSA Key Generation (1024-bit key) 122 seconds 2.2 seconds
RSA Encryption
(1024-bit key, 64-byte data)
172 ms 10 ms
RSA Decryption
(1024-bit key,128-byte data)
856 ms 40 ms
RSA Signing
(1024-bit key,64-bytes data)
833 ms 55 ms
RSA Verification
(1024-bit key, 128-bytes data)
169 ms 5 ms
AES Encryption/Decryption
(128-bit key, 2048-byte data)
583 ms 35 ms
SHA-1 Hash (2048-byte data) 111 ms 5 ms
– Varying sensitivity of applications: In the m-business framework, the anonymity
requirements of applications may totally differ. Consider finding the nearest
restaurant andmobile dating applications. Finding nearest restaurant is a typi-
cal context-aware application. Holding your PDA, you are interested in getting
a list of restaurants which are near to your current location. The second ap-
plication type, context-aware mobile dating, lets users search for suitable chat
partners within a particular area. Comparing these two types of applications,
the latter requires (at least initially) a very high level of anonymity, while the
former may not even need anonymity at all.
– Varying sensitivity of users: Users also tend to have different sensitivity for
anonymity. Consider a celebrity interested in having a very high level of ano-
nymity. He can even require a high level of anonymity for the finding the nearest
restaurant application and never wants other people to know the places that
he eats at.
– Enhancing performance: The previous two requirements point out that en-
forcing a fixed level of anonymity is a security risk since the anonymity level
may be too low. On the other hand, an unnecessary high anonymity level
makes applications waste time waiting for cryptographic operations and data
transmission delays.
Dynamic Anonymity Parameters We have analyzed different Mix-net archi-
tectures and found 7 parameters that affect the anonymity level. These parameters
and their effects are as follows:
1. Path picker: In the Mix-net, initially a message route should be decided. This
parameter specifies the entity that decides this message route. user and first-
mix are possible values of this parameter. user implies that the sender itself
will choose the message route. In this case, the anonymity level is high, but
the fact that the user should encrypt the message for each mix decreases per-
formance. firstmix offers better performance, because the user does not decide
the message route and encrypts the message only for the first mix which then
chooses the path and encrypts the message accordingly. But at the same time,
the anonymity level decreases since the first mix knows both the sender and
the receiver.
2. Mix number: This parameter specifies the exact number of the mixes that
will be used for the transmission of messages from a particular application.
If there are more mixes in the message route, traffic analysis becomes more
complicated and the anonymity level increases. Setting this parameter value to
zero results in a direct communication without any Mix-net nodes in between.
3. User number: In a cascade-style Mix-net, the number of active users on a par-
ticular cascade affects the anonymity level. This parameter defines a minimum
and maximum number of users that should exist on a cascade.
4. New route: This parameter specifies a threshold for the number of connections
over an established circuit. When this threshold is reached, a new route should
be created in order to make traffic analysis more difficult.
5. Message threshold: Upon getting a message, the mix can either forward the
message to the next mix immediately or keep it in its outgoing pool until a
certain condition is fulfilled. This parameter as a condition defines the number
of messages that should exist in the outgoing pool before a message from
the pool is randomly chosen and forwarded. With this option enabled, traffic
analysis becomes more difficult, but also additional delays and/or latency may
be created.
6. Time delay: This parameter is similar to message threshold, but defines the
delay threshold for a message to stay in the outgoing pool, rather than the
number of messages to collect before a send operation.
7. Dummy message: With this parameter enabled, each mix sends extra dummy
messages to other mixes when transmitting a regular message in order to
complicate traffic analysis.
4 Towards A Solution
In this section, we propose an anonymity solution that considers both hardware
limitations and dynamic anonymity requirements. It supports dynamic anonymity
at a sufficient degree, provides reasonable performance and exploits the existing
Mix-net solutions.
In general, attackers capture the messages over the network, link the collected
messages to each other and try to guess who communicates with whom. We will
not be able to prevent attackers from intercepting data packets, but we can com-
plicate the analysis of the gathered data by ensuring the unlinkability of exchanged
messages. This unlinkability can be achieved to a reasonable degree by the mix-net
based anonymity architecture that we describe in the following.
4.1 The Architecture
Based on our preliminary tests (see Table 1), we conclude that the usability of
the m-business framework would be inacceptable if the mobile clients had to deal
with all the relevant cryptographic operations. In our architecture as illustrated in
Figure 1, mobile clients communicate with service providers through an external
Security Provider performing the heavy part of the computations, while mobile
users can still specify the anonymity level for each application individually. This
provides the possibility of running applications with very high anonymity. It be-
comes even possible to eliminate latencies due to anonymity computations only by
modifying the relevant policies. The Security Provider residing between mobile de-
vices and the Mix-network acts as a facade [9] and runs different types of Mix-net
client applications to forward messages over any client, e.g. Jap-client, Tor-client,
etc.
Application Manager, Policy Manager and Anonymity Manager are three main
components in the architecture on the mobile client side. The policies created for
each individual application specify some parameters affecting the anonymity level.
They are stored within the repository of the Policy Manager. When an application
wants to send a message, its request is taken by the Application Manager, which
forwards this request to the Anonymity Manager. Afterwards, the Anonymity
Manager applies to the Policy Manager to retrieve the anonymity policy of this
particular application. Based on the parameters in the policy, the Application
Manager decides how to proceed with the message transmission.
Fig. 1. Anonymity Framework based on Security Provider
Mobile users need to establish only two secure channels, i.e. a channel between
mobile user and security provider and a channel between mobile user and service
provider. The secure channel between mobile user and service providers is estab-
lished through the secure channel between mobile user and security provider. The
required dynamic anonymity based on policies is enforced by running different
Mix-net clients managed by the Security Provider.
The Security Provider consists of three main layers. In the first layer, a server
interface listens for incoming requests, parses the relevant destination and anonymity
parameters, and forwards to the second layer, i.e., to the Mix-net Client Manager
(MCM). In the third layer, different Mix-net clients are installed and executed.
MCM is responsible for managing different Mix-net client applications. The
idea behind installing and managing more than one Mix-net client application is
that dynamic anonymity can be distributed throughout several network types in
order to achieve higher anonymity. Besides, MCM can run different instances of the
same Mix-net client with different configuration parameters and thereby enhance
the dynamic anonymity property. On receiving the payload data, destination and
anonymity parameters, MCM chooses a suitable Mix-net client to send the message
according to the policy parameters of the mobile user.
In Section 3.2, the required parameters for dynamic anonymity were presented.
Both Jap and Tor support some of these parameters. In a Jap network, one can
choose a cascade based on active user numbers (user number parameter). In a
Tor-network, one can configure minimum and maximum node numbers (mix num-
ber parameter). Tor also supports creating a new circuit after sending a particu-
lar number of messages over an established channel (new route parameter). The
dummy message and time threshold parameters are supported by the Jap network
but cannot be changed on the client side. Therefore, the Security Provider emu-
lates their effects as follows. It starts dummy Mix-net clients, and if the mobile
user sets a value for the dummy message parameter, dummy messages are sent
over this dummy Mix-net client. If the time threshold parameter is set, the Se-
curity Provider keeps the message for a particular time and then sends it over
Mix-net clients. Applying time thresholds, timing attacks against exchanged mes-
sages are prevented. Additionally, as an enhancement to dynamic reconfigurability,
the mobile user can also specify within his policy which Mix-net client to use.
Figure 2 illustrates templates encoding the configuration parameters of general
Mix-net and Mix-net clients. Figure 3 illustrates the policies of applications and
their bindings to particular templates.
We have implemented both the gateway and mobile client applications of this
architecture and tested the client software on a PDA. The gateway was encoded
in J2SE and the mobile client in J2ME with CDC configuration. The Security
Provider was installed on the Broker-side. The performance of our implementation
is sufficient for not decreasing the usability of the main application while providing
a sufficient level of anomymity. We refer the reader to [2] for more details on the
implementation such as particular design choices and the communication protocol
between the mobile client and the gateway.
4.2 Security Analysis
As presented in the previous subsection, the client connects to the gateway and
opens a channel through a mix network to the service provider he wants to commu-
nicate with. When the client sends a message to the gateway, the gateway encrypts
the message according to the used Mix-net and sends it through the Mix-net to the
service provider. We assume the goal of an attacker is to learn who communicates
with whom by using traffic analysis. In mix networks, attackers can be categorized
as follows.
– passive or active: Passive attackers are able to observe the messages sent on
the network. Particularly, they can see messages sent from client to gateway,
messages between nodes of the mix network, and between the exit nodes of
the Mix-net and the service providers. Active attackers can additionally insert,
modify, or delete messages in the network.
– external or internal: An internal attacker can control one or more mix nodes
and/or the gateway. He is able to distinguish dummy messages and actual
data messages and can link incoming and outgoing messages of the nodes
he controls. An external attacker, on the other hand, cannot gain control over
Fig. 2. Templates for Anonymity Policy
<templates>
<template id="template_1">
<general>
<parameter name="dummyMessage">5</parameter>
<parameter name="timeDelay">10</parameter>
<parameter name="messageThreshold">5</parameter>
<parameter name="preferredMix">jap</parameter>
</general>
<provider name="jap">
<parameter name="minUser">50</parameter>
<parameter name="maxUser">250</parameter>
</provider>
</template>
<template id="template_2">
<general>
<parameter name="preferredMix">tor</parameter>
</general>
<provider name="tor">
<parameter name="minNode">5</parameter>
<parameter name="maxNode">15</parameter>
<parameter name="createNewRoute">yes</parameter>
</provider>
</template>
</templates>
any node in the architecture. We note that an attacker controlling the gateway
would be fatal in our architecture, since the gateway knows the communication
partners of the clients.
– partial or global: A partial attacker has influence only on a part of the system,
while a global attacker can potentially attack the whole system.
An attacker is commonly assumed to be global, passive, and external. How-
ever, since the Mix-nets that underly our architecture are not secure against such
attackers, our system is not, either. Additionally, a compromised gateway would
completely expose the identity of all users running ther traffic through it. However,
users are reasonably protected against active, internal and partial attackers who
control only small number of mix nodes, not including the gateway.
The intentions of attackers may vary. A service provider may be interested in
the identities (i.e., e-mail and postal addresses, etc.) of his competitor’s customers
in order to alienate them with specific advertisements. For his own customers,
he may want to personalize mailings based on data collected by user profiling.
Another possible attacker is a black user who tries to find out the providers that
his target user is communicating with.
Fig. 3. Application Policy
<policies>
<policy id="p1" belongsto="app_1" anonLevel="template_1" />
<policy id="p2" belongsto="app_2" anonLevel="template_2" />
</policies>
5 Discussion
The presented approach is very realistic and applicable. As extra computations,
the mobile devices have to handle only two secure channels. Besides, dynamic
anonymity property has been realized at a presumably satisfying degree.
Another advantage of this architecture is that it promotes weak coupling be-
tween the mobile devices and particular Mix-net implementations, such that ex-
isting and well-established Mix-networks can be integrated in a way that is trans-
parent for mobile devices. Especially when support of an additional Mix-net im-
plementation is to be added to the framework, the client component must only be
deployed to the Security Provider but not to mobile devices. From both security
and software engineering points of view, this is a very desirable property.
As a drawback, the proposed architecture requires a trusted anonymizer. In
case the Security Provider is compromised, anonymity fails. However, we note
that the Broker, which already acts as a trusted third party from the business
point of view, can be used as a trusted anonymizer. Hence, our solution does not
necessarily introduce an additional trusted party.
6 Future Work
Having implemented this architecture, the next step is to study how and at which
degree the configuration parameters affect the anonymity level. This is required
for the optimal specification of the anonymity templates.
Policies and their configuration parameters provide dynamic anonymity. But
it is neither realistic nor practical to expect non-technical mobile users to specify
their own policies and parameters for each application. This process should be
as easy as possible. For example, users could choose from pre-defined anonymity
levels, e.g. ranging from high to low, for individual applications or the whole m-
business client running on the device. The templates for different anonymity levels
could be defined based on empirical tests and user interviews.
7 Conclusion
Within a mobile business framework, hiding real identities of mobile users is an
important requirement. Dynamic anonymity and the limited capabilities of mobile
devices are two new challenges which the existing Mix-net solutions for communi-
cation anonymity do not take into consideration.
In this paper, we present an approach towards dynamic mobile anonymity over
a Security Provider gateway managing different mix-net clients. Our approach
overcomes the performance problem and satisfies dynamic anonymity at some
degree by preserving the benefits of existing Mix-net framework and client appli-
cations.
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